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Australia is currently developing a carbon emissions trading program. The Garnaut 
report recommendations include options for emissions trajectories, coverage, permit 
allocation, inter-temporality, governance and compliance. This paper reports the 
results of a series of economic experiments in which we explored spot and future 
markets given high and low levels of carbon credit reductions. The results provide 
important insights to the current debate in Australia and highlight the importance of 
well crafted market design. 
 
 





Markets for pollution control have been advocated as a means to efficiently manage 
emissions. In particular the use of cap-and-trade schemes (referred to as emissions 
trading schemes in this paper) for the control of carbon pollution and other 
greenhouse gasses have increased in popularity. Several emissions trading programs 
are currently in operation, such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the US Acid 
Rain and Reclaim programs, and the NSW Greenhouse Gas Reduction scheme.   
Australia is now developing a national carbon emissions trading scheme in order to 
reduce its carbon emissions.   
 
In the recent reports released in relation to this scheme, the Garnaut Review (2008) 
and the governments Green Paper (2008), a number of institutional options have been 
discussed, including the emissions trajectory, coverage, permit allocation, inter-
temporality, governance and compliance. This paper tests in a laboratory setting two 
of the policy options discussed in the Garnaut Review (2008); emissions trajectory 
and inter-temporality.   
 
Previous experimental research has examined a number of aspects of carbon markets.  
The majority of this experimental research relates to the examination of, type of 
market institution (revenue neutral auctions versus double auctions versus 
discriminative price auctions) (Cason 1993, 1995; Cason and Gangadharan 1998; 
Cason and Plott 1996; Franciosi et al. 1993; Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore 1994), 
market power (Brown-Kruse et al. 1995; Carlen 1999, 2003; Cason et al. 2003; 
Godby et al. 1998; Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore 1994)
  and compliance behaviour 
(Cason and Gangadharan 2006a; Murphy and Stanlund 2006; Murphy and Stranlund 
2007) in an emissions trading scheme
1.  However little attention has been paid to the 
role of the emissions trajectory or futures markets in an emissions trading scheme. 
 
In this paper we examine how different emission trajectories and spot and futures 
markets, may effect an emissions trading scheme in terms of compliance and market 
efficiency.  As well as testing the effects of two of the policy options discussed for the 
proposed Australian scheme this research adds to the current experimental literature 
on compliance within an emissions trading scheme.   
 
Compliance behaviour within an emissions trading scheme is a critical factor in the 
success of a scheme and differs significantly from that under a command-and-control 
situation (Murphy and Stanlund 2006; Murphy and Stranlund 2007).  Previous 
research suggests that within an emissions trading scheme, compliance is not only 
linked to the enforcement strategy but also to different aspects of the market design.  
 
Murphy and Stranlund (2006) examine compliance behaviour within an emissions 
trading scheme.  They find that compliance choices are influenced by both a direct 
effect from the enforcement strategy as well as an indirect market effect. Further, 
Cason and Gagadharan (2006b) examine the interaction between banking and 
compliance decisions and find that where banking is allowed compliance is decreased.  
                                                 
1 Muller and Mestelman (1998) provide a good overview of the experimental literature related to 
emissions trading.  
 
These previous studies suggest that interactions between various policy options within 
an emissions trading program play an important role in determining compliance 
behaviour.  
 
We design an experiment based on the proposed Australian scheme. In our design 
permits are able to be traded into spot and future markets. This is crossed with 
treatments for a stringent and relaxed reduction in the emissions cap over time. The 
next section provides an overview of literature surrounding the two options.  We then 





The objective of an emissions trading scheme is to provide the incentive for firms to 
reduce emissions to a given level in an efficient manner. For example, Australia has 
committed to reducing emissions by 60% of 2000 levels by 2050.  However, due to 
the long term nature of climate change and the time lags involved in technological 
development and uptake, the emissions cap is generally proposed in terms of a 
reduction schedule rather than a significant singular reduction in emissions (Stavins 
2007; Wigley et al. 1996).  A number of studies have examined the effect of various 
reduction schedules on the cost of technological change or mitigation (Goulder and 
Mathai 2000; Grübler and Messner 1998; Jaffe et al. 1999, 2002; Manne and Richels 
1997, 2004; Richels and Edmonds 1995; Schneider and Goulder 1997; Wigley et al. 
1996).  It has been argued that the trajectory chosen to achieve the final level of 
stabilisation is of as much importance in determining the costs of mitigation, as the 
actual level of final stabilisation (Richels and Edmonds 1995).   
 
A number of studies (Manne and Richels 1997; Richels and Edmonds 1995; Wigley 
et al. 1996) have argued for gradual reductions in concentrations in C02 in the near 
term with more stringent reductions in later periods.  Three reasons for a gradual 
reduction away from business as usual have been proposed.  First, the positive 
marginal productivity of capital means that the further in the future the reduction falls, 
the smaller the contribution must be now.  Second, sudden changes in the 
configuration of current capital stock will be costly without adequate time to adjust.  
Finally, over time the efficiency and availability of abatement technology will 
improve and hence in the long term the costs of mitigation will be lower.  This finding 
is upheld by Manne and Richels (2004) where they find that including learning-by-
doing into their model does not change the outcome that a gradual transition away 
from business as usual is superior to aggressive near term cuts.   
 
In contrast, while acknowledging that there exist a number of possible emission 
reduction schedules, the Garnaut Review (2008) states that as long as the final level of 
emissions is equal there is no strong evidence to distinguish between paths.  We test 
the effect of a stringent and relaxed reduction in permits on compliance and market 
efficiency. 
 
To our knowledge, Ben-David (2000) is the only other published experimental study 
to examine the effect of a declining cap on an emissions trading scheme.  Ben-David 
(2000) examines the effect of uncertainty regarding the timing of as well as the 
magnitude of a one off decline in emission allowances on technological change and  
 
price stability. Ben-David (2000) finds that uncertainty in emissions allowance 
reductions results in no change to market prices but states that this is likely to be from 
the interaction with technological uptake. Unlike the scenario examined by Ben-
David, in the scheme proposed for Australia, emissions reductions will not be highly 
uncertain with measures in place in order to reduce the uncertainty of timing and 
magnitude (see Garnaut 2008).  Further, our design examines the effect of a 
continuous reduction in emission permits, as it is unlikely that only a one-off 
reduction will be imposed. 
 
The second design feature we examine is the role of futures markets.  In markets for 
pollution such as greenhouse gases, inter-temporal flexibility plays a large role in 
ensuring market success (Stavins 1998; Stern 2007). Often firms are required to make 
long term decisions regarding emissions and technological uptake, however, 
uncertainty surrounding the future price and supply of permits may reduce the 
effectiveness of such decisions. Hence, compliance over time may be smoothed by 
providing greater certainty surrounding future prices (Stern 2007).   
 
Futures markets have long been used in the commodity market to reduce the risk 
associated with uncertainty in future prices.  Where long term decisions must be 
made, futures markets reduce uncertainty by providing information on the future price 
and timing of delivery.  This future price is a reflection of expectations for future 
demand and supply, where markets are functioning efficiently (Burns 1983; Garnaut 
Review 2008).  Thus, futures markets aid efficiency at three levels. They improve 
liquidity by providing certainty of price, enhance pricing efficiency or the degree to 
which prices reflect supply and demand, and they decrease transaction costs by 
reducing the cost of searching and acquiring the asset (Burns 1983). We investigate 
the effect of liquidity on compliance, and the degree of pricing efficiency achieved by 
the futures markets. 
 
A number of greenhouse gas emission schemes currently operating have provisions 
for future trading (for example, EU ETS, US Acid Rain program) and reports, such as 
the Garnaut Review (2008) and Stern Review (2007) have acknowledged the use of 
futures markets as a way to improve market efficiency.  However, very little literature 
exists examining the role of futures markets in a carbon trading scheme (see Maeda 
2001; Truck et al. 2006).  While a vast body of literature exists for future trading in 
commodity and asset markets, emission permit markets differ significantly from these 
markets. Emission permits do not provide a future stream of dividends or utility and 
the only purpose of holding an emission permit is for compliance with regulation 
(Maeda 2001).    
 
In the experimental literature, Muller and Mestelman (1994) and Godby et al (1997) 
investigate a futures market particular to a design proposed in a Canadian nitrous-
oxide trading scheme.  In this design shares are able to be traded for future periods 
and each share provides the holder with a given number of coupons (or permits). In 
Godby et al (1997), uncertainty in emissions was introduced to the design.  Muller 
and Mestelman found that by including the share market, market efficiency and 
compliance were improved.  However these studies were highly specific to the 
Canadian scheme.  
  
 
By contrast, we investigate the effects of a futures market based on the Australian 
proposal.  Further we examine the interactions of high and low emissions trajectories 






Given the current literature on emission trading schemes, we posed the following 
questions: 
 
1.  Are markets able to adjust to period by period declining permit stocks? 
2.  Does the rate of decline in carbon permits impact on compliance? 
3.  Do futures markets produce better results than simple spot markets in terms of 
compliance and market activity? 
 
The experimental design (given in Table 1) examined high and low abatement 
trajectories with a spot versus a futures market. A total of 12 experimental sessions 
were conducted at Griffith University, with 8 subjects in each session.  In each of the 
sessions, subjects traded emission permits in a posted offer market, and made 
decisions regarding their level of emissions and hence compliance.    
 
Table 1: Experimental Design 

















In order to minimise biases, the emissions decision was framed as a decision 
regarding production of a good and emissions permits were labelled simply as 
permits.  However, in context, units produced by subjects are equivalent to units of 
emissions and each permit equates to a right to produce one unit of emissions. 
 
Subjects were informed that they were the producer of a fictitious good and that they 
could produce this good up to a maximum production level.  Subjects were told that 
for each unit of their good they produced they would earn their value of production.  
They were also given a stock of permits and informed that for each unit they produced 
they were required to hold a permit. Subjects faced random auditing and if found to 
have less permits than their production they would face a fine. Subjects were 
informed that their aim was to maximise their earnings taking into account their 
earnings from production, trade and any fines they may receive.  . 
 
Subjects were endowed with an initial allocation of permits that they could trade in 
the market and were informed that each round the number of permits they would 
receive in their initial allocation would decline by a given number (depending on 
which treatment they were in). Under treatments with a ‘high reduction’ the initial  
 
allocation of permits was reduced by 7 permits each round, compared to a reduction 
of 4 permits each round in the ‘low reduction’ treatments.  In both treatments, subjects 
started round 1 with an initial allocation of 90 permits. The allocation of permits each 
round is given in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Initial Allocation of Permits for each Round 
 
Round  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low  90 86 82 78 74 70 66 62 54 50 
High  90 83 76 69 62 55 48 41 34 27 
 
In the first stage of the experiment, subjects were able to trade their permits in a 
posted offer market that was open for four minutes.  Offers to sell (asks), posted by 
subjects were displayed on a trade table accessible to all subjects and subjects were 
able to purchase permits from any of the available offers to sell.  In the treatments 
with a futures market, subjects were able to post offers to and purchase permits from 
any future periods.  In the spot market treatments subjects were only able to trade in 
the current period. Once the market closed, subjects were asked to submit a decision 
regarding their level of production. Subjects earned a given marginal benefit for each 
unit of production and all subjects were constrained by a maximum production at 100 
units. Subjects were endowed with differing marginal values in order to provide gains 
from trade. 
 
In all treatments subjects faced a penalty if found to be non-compliant. In order to be 
compliant subjects were required to hold permits equal to or greater than their 
production.  In all treatments subjects were audited depending on a 40% probability of 
being audited and if found to be non-compliant fined.  The fine structure was 
determined by setting the expected value of the fine equal to the equilibrium price in 
that period.   
 
Table 3 shows the marginal values and expected distribution of permits after trade.  
As the allocation of permits declines permits redistribute to higher value players.  In 
the case of a high reduction in permits this moves the market from a highly 
competitive market to a duopsony with only two buyers. Table 4 shows the expected 
price of permits and penalties for each period. As the allocation of permits (supply) 
falls the price was expected to increase, with the high reduction treatment increasing 




Table 3: Player Characteristics and Expected Distribution of Permits at End of Trade. 
 
 Low  High 
Player Marginal 
Value 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1  40  20  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2  60  100  88  56  24  0 0 0 0 0 0 100  64  8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3  80  100  100  100 100 92  60  28  0 0 0 100  100 100 52  0 0 0 0 0 0 
4  100  100  100  100 100 100 100 100 96 64 32 100  100 100 100 96 40 0  0  0  0 
5  120  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 84  28  0  0 
6  140  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 72  16 
7  160  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 




Table 4: Equilibrium Prices and Associated Penalties for Non-Compliance 
  Period  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low 
Equilibrium 
Price  50 50 70 70 70 90 90 90 90 110 
Penalty  125 125 175 175 175 225 225 225 225 275 
High 
Equilibrium 
Price  50 70 70 90 90 110  110  130  130  150 





Each experimental session consisted of eight participants. Experiments were carried 
out at Griffith University in Brisbane, Australia using The Experimental Software 
System (TESS). Participants were recruited from the University’s student population 
through a web-based recruitment system. On arrival at the experiment, each 
participant was randomly assigned to a computer, provided with a set of instructions, 
and asked to complete a quiz to ensure they understood the experiment.  Once 
participants answered all the questions correctly, they received a password enabling 
them to access the experiment. 
 
Computer screens showed participants the marginal value of their good, the maximum 
number of goods they could produce and their allocation of permits.  Each period 
commenced with an onscreen posted offer market. At the conclusion of the market a 
decision box appeared in which participants entered their production decision. 
Participants were audited at random and fined when appropriate. 
 
Each experimental session consisted of eight participants. Participants were paid 
$A10 for agreeing to participate and showing up on time and were then given an 
opportunity to earn additional money in the experiment. Total earnings ranged from 
$A12 to $A45. In accordance with standard experimental economics procedures and 
protocols, earnings were paid in cash at the end of each experiment. Each 





The experimental data was analysed using random effects model assuming 
autoregressive one covariance structures. The analysis that follows focuses on levels 
of compliance and market activity.  
 
Levels of Compliance 
 
Table 5 and the associated Figure 1 show the analysis of non-compliance for all 
treatments across the 10 periods. When the level of production exceeds the number of 
permits held a player is non-compliant. There is a significant interaction between the 
level of permit reduction (high_low) and the type of market (spot_futures) in  
 
explaining non-compliance (p=0.024). Figure 1 suggests that futures markets 
increases compliance compared to spot markets given low levels of permit reduction. 
With high levels of permit reduction, futures market compliance was less than spot 
market compliance. Overall, non-compliance is greater given low levels of permit 
reduction compared to high levels of permit reduction. 
 
Table 5:  Random Effects Model of Non-Compliance 
 
Treatment  Coef.  Std. Err.  Z  P>|z|  95% conf. Interval 
high_low -10.73278  16.35035 -0.66  0.512  -42.77887  21.31332 
spot_futures 38.89661  16.35035  2.38  0.017  6.850514 70.9427 
interaction -52.16541  23.12288 -2.26  0.024 -97.48543  -6.845393 
constant 18.82627  11.56144  1.63  0.103  -3.833737  41.48628 
Wald = 16.46 p = 0.0025 
 








The other important dimension to compliance is market activity. Table 6 summarises 
the panel data analysis of market prices. The results show that market prices were 
higher under the high level of permit reduction consistent with expectations (p = 
0.022).  Figure 2 shows the increase in market prices as the supply of permits declines 
for high and low treatments. 
 
 Table 6: Random Effects Model of Market Prices 
Treatment  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  95% conf. Interval 
spot_future -7.43048  9.022032 -0.82  0.410  -25.11334  10.25238 
high_low 20.70647  9.022032 2.30  0.022  3.023613  38.38933 
Constant 91.98258  7.813309  11.77 0.000  76.66878  107.2964 
Wald = 5.97 p = 0.2015. Interaction not significant and so excluded. 
 





Figure 3 graphically compares the realised permit prices in the experiments with those 
modelled across the four treatments. It can be seen that in all treatments the realised 











Table 7 and Figure 4 summarise the difference between mean spot and forward prices 
under a high and low reduction. When faced with a high level of permit reduction 
players underestimated the value of future permits. The realised spot prices in high 
reduction markets were significantly greater than the future prices into the same 
period reflecting the risk premium associated with future trading (p values range 0.00 
to 0.043). The differential increased through time. Overall, in low reduction markets 
forward and spot prices were not significantly different suggesting that the low 
reduction did not induce a risk premium
2. 
 
Table 7: Random Effects Model of Market Prices 
 
Mean Prices  Futures Market, Low Reduction  Futures Market, High Reduction 
Round  7  8  9 10  7 8 9 10 
Spot  Price  93.36  95.44  104.94 109.32 112.60 120.44 135.88 154.26 
Forward  Price 92.50 94.88 93.75 111.42  110  110  122.50  132.90 
p-value  0.934  0.924  0.023 0.740 0.015 0.000 0.043 0.000 
                                                 




Figure 4: Mean prices for spot and forward trades with a high and low reduction 
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Table 8 and Figure 5 show the analysis of quantities traded by market type across 
periods. There was no significant difference in the average quantity traded between 
the low and high reduction treatments (p = 0.098). Spot markets resulted in higher 
average quantities traded compared to future markets (p= 0.016).  
 
Table 8: Random Effects Model of Market Quantities 
 
Treatment  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  95% conf. Interval 
spot_future 3.025735  1.255851  2.41  0.016 .5643127  5.487157 
high_low -2.080926  1.255851 -1.66  0.098  -4.542349  .3804962 
constant 11.99493  1.087599  11.03 0.000  9.863281  14.12659 
















Figure 6 shows the modelled and actual quantities traded. The quantity traded in all 
markets was less than optimal. This can be seen in the future markets in particular. 
 





Table 9, and the associated Figure 7, summarises differences in spot and future 
quantities traded in/into the last 4 periods. Within the low reduction markets, the size 
of spot trades was not significantly different to the future trades. This, combined with 
the fact that the spot and future market prices were not significantly different within 
low reduction markets, suggests that players felt confident in future trading in low 
reduction environments.   
 
Table 9: Difference between Mean Spot and Forward Quantities Traded Under a High 
and Low Reduction 
Mean Quantity  Futures Market, Low Reduction  Futures Market, High Reduction 
Round  7  8  9 10  7 8 9 10 
Spot  Qty  11.68  10.83  12.35 10.84 10.94 10.82 11.85 8.36 
Forward  Qty  6.67  11.38  11.50  7.92 2.00 5.00 7.00 6.70 
p-value  0.250  0.891  0.815 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.442 0.522 
. 
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Figure 8 shows the spot and future quantities traded by nature of permit reduction. 
Future trades into earlier periods were low but increased significantly in latter periods. 
The total volume traded in futures low reduction markets was significantly greater 













Discussion and conclusions 
 
We expected that a high level of permit reduction would lead to lower compliance and 
greater use of futures markets. This was not the case. The high level of permit 
reduction led to higher levels of compliance and fewer futures trades than occurred in 
the low level permit reduction treatment experiments. One possible explanation is that 
higher levels of reduction led to greater uncertainty and higher levels of risk aversion 
which in turn led to greater compliance and less future trading. Future trade prices 
underestimated the realised spot prices. With market maturity, future market activity 
and convergence of spot and future trade prices may improve. 
 
Low permit reductions led to better predictions of future trade prices but less 
compliance compared to high permit reductions. In this case, futures markets were 
found to be effective in improving compliance. Future trade prices were consistent 
with the realised spot prices and future trades made up a greater proportion of traded 
permits.  
 
The policy implications of these results are that if the authority is concerned with 
achieving an emission target quickly, high rates of permit reduction with spot markets 
should be considered. Based on the experimental data, there should be high rates of 
compliance and limited need for futures markets during the initial phase. If a low 
emissions trajectory is adopted then it should be implemented with a futures market 
option. Higher rates of non-compliance could be expected.  
  
 
The findings of this work are based on experimentation. Further research is required 
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